Abkhazia is unsettled once again, and the "parliament" is in an uproar. The passions surrounding the Moscow directives — bearing the lengthy title "Program for the Formation of a Common Social and Economic Space Based on the Harmonization of the Legislation of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Russian Federation" — refuse to subside. And now a second document has arrived: the "Foreign Policy Concept of the Republic of Abkhazia," approved by "President" Aslan Bzhania, which has caused no less of a stir. But while in the first case the majority of society and the political spectrum — recognizing in the "Program" a direct threat of Abkhazia's absorption by Russia — came out categorically against the document sent from Moscow, in the second case the opposite is true: they are for the adoption of the Concept. The only opposition to it comes from the pro-Russian camp — primarily former officials who have been pushed away from the state feeding trough (filled until recently with Russian finances) and their supporters. This is entirely understandable: for the first time in a document of this kind, a provision appeared on the normalization of relations with Tbilisi (Point 2.3), and Moscow — which is actively drawing Abkhazia into yet another "Union State" it is constructing on the post-Soviet space — has absolutely no need for Sukhumi's cooperation with Tbilisi.

Against the backdrop of the opposition's loud accusations of "betrayal" and "treason," it is not easy to determine what is more dangerous — being finally absorbed by Russia, or conducting dialogue and trade-economic cooperation with Tbilisi. All the more so given that no one has properly explained to Abkhazia's population the substance of Tbilisi's proposals, which Georgian authorities have voiced on multiple occasions. Particularly carefully concealed in Abkhazia is the fact that all of Tbilisi's peace initiatives — relating in particular to free medical care, free education at leading Western universities, the export of Abkhazian producers' goods to the European market on preferential terms, and so on — presuppose an approach entirely acceptable to the Abkhazian side: no one is forcing residents of Abkhazia who wish to take advantage of these opportunities to acquire Georgian citizenship, obtain Georgian documents, or take on any political obligations whatsoever.

Former Abkhazian officials who have been left without their comfortable supplement also greatly dislike discussing where the millions sent from Moscow "for the development of Abkhazia" went in their time, or why the "strategic partner" and "friend" — who spent all these years turning a blind eye to the constant embezzlement of the financial flows it allocated — was clearly not particularly eager for Abkhazia to finally begin developing independently, growing stronger, and genuinely approaching the state of independence that has to this day remained merely declaratory. They themselves saw all of this perfectly well, understanding what such "friendship" and "strategic partnership" could ultimately mean for Abkhazia — yet without a twinge of conscience they continued to direct the money sent from Moscow into their own capacious pockets, apparently not knowing at the time such concepts as "treason," "betrayal of national interests," and so on. The current opposition "came to its senses" in this regard only now — when the "strategic friend" has shown its true face and real intentions; when Moscow, which had been keeping them fed, has only a little further to go to achieve its own goals; and when, to assist it, it is necessary on one hand to drive the current "authorities" — who are attempting to seek an alternative in order to save the situation — into a dead end, and on the other to frighten and disorient the population, lest anyone decide to resist the final realization of the Kremlin's maximum program. Russia has more than enough force to suppress any possible protest — it has official and unofficial military bases at every turn in Abkhazia — but naturally it would prefer to accomplish everything without "unnecessary" blood, noise, and dust. And the Abkhazian opposition, it appears, is ready to help its Russian sponsor in every way. All the more so given that many of its representatives have by now accumulated quite substantial financial, property, and other debts to their Russian partners.

The opposition voiced its arguments against the Concept — and especially the point concerning dialogue and cooperation with Tbilisi — on December 21st at an extraordinary session of the "parliament." In particular, public figure Leila Tania declared that the united opposition "also wants to unblock the country, but there are other ways to do this." "This can be done not through Georgia — which is, personally, a very controversial and questionable option for me — but by another route: through international mechanisms, with reliance on Russia's decisive voice," she said. But why Abkhazia has not been "unblocked with reliance on Russia's decisive voice" to this day — despite the "strategic partner" having committed to comprehensive support for both broad international recognition and the economic development of Abkhazia as far back as the so-called major treaty of 2014 — and what exactly gives grounds to hope that anything will change in this regard now, Tania did not clarify.

Temur Nadaraia — a representative of the opposition veterans' organization Aruaa and former head of the Gali district "administration," relieved of his position in part due to the uncovering of a series of corruption schemes — once again demanded during the discussion that the "president" revoke the decision to approve the Concept and return it to the "parliament" for consideration. At the same time, he proposed on behalf of Aruaa that a provision be added to the document on "promoting worldwide recognition of the genocide committed by Georgia against the people of Abkhazia," and introducing the concept of "systemic genocide," which, in the view of the supporters of the previous "authorities," "characterizes the relationship between Abkhazia and Georgia throughout the entire 20th century." As Nadaraia stated, he and his allies want "all countries recognizing Abkhazia's independence to recognize the genocide" — and the first to be approached with such a request should be the State Duma of the Russian Federation, as the Tskhinvali "authorities" have already done. But what the recognition of "genocide" by Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Nauru has given "South Ossetia" and how it would help Abkhazia's development — Nadaraia did not clarify.

He also reiterated Aruaa's argument that Point 2.3 of the Concept — "The Republic of Abkhazia allows for the possibility of creating conditions for establishing an additional format of multi-level negotiations between Georgia and the Republic of Abkhazia, within which it will be possible to discuss with the Georgian side issues of mutual interest that cannot be addressed within the framework of the International Geneva Discussions" — if implemented, would "not only relegate the Geneva Discussions — held pursuant to the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreements — to the background, but also lower the status of the negotiating process," and that "due to the change in the status of the negotiations, Abkhazia could not only lose its international mediators but formally revert to the period before international recognition."

However, all of these arguments were immediately refuted by "Foreign Minister" Daur Kove, who explained that "this concerns the possibility of establishing precisely an additional format, and in no way a replacement for the Geneva one." "We have always stated and continue to state the importance of continuing the International Geneva Discussions, and we will continue them," the "minister" clarified. As for the opposition's view that the possible new format would amount to "negotiations tête-à-tête, without intermediaries, on the territory of a third party," Kove pointed out that nothing of the kind is in fact stated in the Concept.

And Secretary of the "Security Council" Sergei Shamba explained the "authorities'" overall position as follows: "No one is saying that we are right now seeking to conduct negotiations with Georgia. They may not take place at all — after all, it depends on the Georgian side's desire too. But our foreign policy must have this right. That is, in the event of circumstances arising in which certain topics are to be discussed with us, our foreign policy body must have such a right. In general, any country must have a clear diplomacy. And we — in conditions where we have a conflict with one of our neighboring states — want to say that there should be no talks? It is precisely when there is a conflict that one must talk. But I repeat — one must talk on the principles enshrined in our Constitution and serving our national interests — that is, from the position of our independence and sovereignty."

I think any unprejudiced and clear-headed citizen who has heard the positions of both sides on the Concept can see clearly who is being disingenuous — citing arguments pulled out of thin air — and who is right in their attempts to find alternative paths, beyond the Russian "partnership" that has clearly not justified itself, for leading Abkhazia out of crisis. Many in Abkhazia are already converging on the view that, having fully entrusted its future to Russia — signing with it in 2014 an agreement on alliance and strategic partnership, and on November 12th, 2020 also the "Program for the Formation of a Common Social and Economic Space Based on the Harmonization of Legislation" — if nothing changes now (going by the "reassurances" the "president" Bzhania offered the people of Abkhazia on December 3rd — in effect stating that there is already no way out without Russia, even if one very much wished for it), the republic has only one prospect: accession to the latest alliance of Russia's "friends" that the "strategic friend" is constructing in the post-Soviet space to serve its own interests. On the other hand, the initiative of the current "authorities" on trade relations with Tbilisi — dictated by economic practicality and strategic political considerations — could help Abkhazia break out of its economic and political impasse, could make the lives of citizens dignified through a developing economy, investments, and favorable conditions for business.

What is more dangerous — accepting the Moscow "Program" of directives and becoming fully absorbed by Russia, or the Concept on the basis of which dialogue and cooperation with Tbilisi could begin on mutually acceptable terms and formats — is for the population of Abkhazia to decide. At present, its majority does not share the view of the united opposition. And according to Abkhazia's Constitution, it is precisely the opinion of the citizens that should be decisive in such matters.

The fact that the "parliament" — after loudly deliberating on the Concept on December 23rd — supported the "president's" document by a majority vote and rejected the opposition's proposal to return it for additional consideration can be seen as a spark of hope. But it is critically important for the "authorities" not to allow the corrupt pro-Russian opposition to once again take the initiative and dictate the political agenda, believe those in Tbilisi.

"In the recent past, Aslan Bzhania — as well as Sergei Shamba — repeatedly noted the necessity of establishing, for the benefit of the Abkhazian people and without any artificial barriers or conditions, cooperation with Tbilisi in the spheres of trade, economy, education, medicine, and so on. This position not only deserves welcome and support — it represents a real path out of the crisis. This path will be thorny, and it is clear that Russia will continue to create every possible obstacle along it, using corrupt pro-Russian oppositionists for this purpose among others. It is therefore critically important that Aslan Bzhania's team — if of course its position, expressed in part in the spirit of the aforementioned Concept, has not changed — does not yield the initiative to destructive forces, does not allow them to dictate the political agenda. This will be difficult, but critically necessary," believes Paata Gaprindashvili, Director of the Georgian Reform Association (GRASS).

Gvantsa Pipia

The material was prepared as part of a joint project of the Accent news agency and the non-governmental organization GRASS, implemented with the financial support of the Open Information Partnership (OIP).